

STAFF INTELLIGENCE GROUP

DOCUMENT CONTROL

Series 1M Classification TS (24339)
Number 194 Number of copies 20
Date of Document 10 August 1949

DISTRIBUTION

COPY NO. BRANCH OR AGENCY DATE SIGNATURE OR RECEIPT

1 DCI 8/11/49
2 AD/ROE 8/11/49
3, 4, 5, 6, 7 JIG [REDACTED] 8/11/49
8 B/NE 9/9/49
9 OCB 9/23
10 D/EE 12/9

25X1A9a

25X1A9a

INTELLOFAX 3

Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-01617A000600050002-5

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM NO. 194

10 August 1949

SUBJECT: CIA Comment on Selected Questions on Presentation by
JIG on Phase I of JIC 435/21, dated 16 May 1949.

REFERENCES: IM-192 and IM-193, same subject, covering other questions
previously commented on.

1. Question 4. (a)

Question - What are the probable or possible developments if the
"cold war" continues during 1952?

Answer - The expansion or contraction of the "cold war" will take place, as it has in the past, in relation to (1) US and USSR short-term policy objectives, (2) US and USSR estimates of comparative strengths and weaknesses in all areas where their interests are in conflict, (3) USSR estimates of its capacity to unbalance US policy and to reverse US successes in particular areas, (4) USSR estimates of its capacity to drain US resources into blind alleys by the creation of pressures calling for countermeasures. There is no reason to think that the methods of "cold war," as used by the USSR will fundamentally change. They are designed to be applicable to a multiplicity of situations which exist or are developing in a variety of forms and in many areas in the world. The intensity with which the methods of "cold war" will be applied in any given area and at any given time are practically beyond prediction. It can be predicted, however, that the broad objectives of the "cold war" will continue to be (1) to create and to exploit every possible social, economic and political tension in all areas where a US-Western interest requires stability for its protection, (2) to plan and execute subversive acts designed to reduce the economic and military potential of the US-West, (3) to persuade mass opinion that the Communist concept of society is dynamic and that the Democratic-Christian concept of society is restrictive and based on class interests.

Question - In what particular areas and by what methods will the USSR be likely to continue its policies of expansion and obstructionism?

Answer - (1) Expansion: areas geographically contiguous with the USSR-Satellite Bloc. Methods - political subversion, comp d'etat, threats of force, police state techniques, propaganda exploitation of pronounced social cleavages.

Note: This memorandum has not been coordinated with the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air Force.

RETURN TO ARCHIVES & RECORDS CENTER
IMMEDIATELY AFTER USE

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

78-1617 BOX 6

Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-01617A000600050002-5

23503/1

Document No. 001
NO CHANGE in Class. ☐
☐ DECLASSIFIED
Class. CHANGED TO: TS S
DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77
Auth: DDA REG. 77/1763
Date: 10/14/77 By: 011

~~TOP SECRET~~

(2) Obstructionism: areas within reach of actual and potential non-Soviet influence, i.e., Western Europe, Near and Middle East, Indian Subcontinent Southeast Asia, Pacific Island Fringe, Australasia, Africa, Latin America. Methods - political activity of Communist Parties, culturally subversive propaganda exploiting local tensions, economic subversion by strikes, labor demands, and industrial sabotage.

2. Question 5. (b)

Question - Will the USSR change its tactics to cooperation and "sweetness and light?"

Answer - There is nothing in the international situation as of August 1949, or projections thereof six months forward, to justify a general conclusion that the USSR will change its tactics as suggested. A single exception is noted: a possible reduction of "cold war" pressures in Western Europe for the purpose of diverting US and Western European attention away from the implementation of policies designed to increase their military potential and to improve their security position. The following factors work, however, against such a decision: (1) financial crisis in Western Europe is sufficiently diversionary, (2) presumption of an economic crisis in US-West, an integral part of the USSR doctrine of historical development, which would lead to increased opportunities for pressure, particularly of a subversive nature, against the capitalist world, (3) opportunities for "cold war" exploitation significantly exist in the Far East and Occupied Countries and lead to increased rather than reduced pressure. Such opportunities continue to exist, but to a lesser degree, in the Near and Middle East and will probably be subject to opportunistic exploitation.

Question - In such a case, will the change be genuine or will it have the purpose of weakening the US militarily and economically?

Answer - If the change suggested should occur, it should be read as a USSR estimate to the effect that the US will be more effectively weakened by a period of cooperation than by a continuation of the "cold war." The grounds for such an estimate are not discernible in the existing international situation.

3. Question 7. (d)

Question - What is the likelihood of the following situation developing in the non-Soviet world?

Answer - (1) World depression: possible.
(2) Revolution in Philippines: unlikely.
(3) Revolution in Occupied Areas,

(a) Germany: unlikely.
(b) Austria: very unlikely.
(c) Japan: unlikely.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET CONFIDENTIAL~~

(4) Revolution or war in Latin America: revolution, in the sense of military coup d'etat, possible; war, in the sense of significant armed conflict between major states, unlikely.

(5) Revolution or war in Middle East: revolution, in the sense of coup d'etat or fanatical outbreaks, possible; war, in the sense of more or less disorganized guerrilla activities, possible.

(6) Revolution or war in Indian Subcontinent: revolution unlikely; war possible.

(7) In countries signing Atlantic Pact,

(a) Aggravated strikes or sabotage: unlikely in UK, Norway, Denmark, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Portugal; possible in France, Italy, Iceland.

(b) Increased Communist political influence: unlikely in UK, Norway, Denmark, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Portugal, Belgium and Italy; possible in France and Iceland.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~